III. The Essential Intent of the "Middle Way" Is to Split China
Following more than half-a-century's concerted efforts of the peoples of all its ethnic groups, Tibet has embarked on a path of development conforming to the times and the people's fundamental interests, and made tremendous strides forward. However, in their pursuit of "Tibetan independence," the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have always turned a blind eye to Tibet's development and progress, denying the achievements made by the people of Tibet and rejecting the sound path that Tibet has taken.
Over the course of the years, the Dalai group has kept modifying its tactics for "Tibetan independence." In March 1959, it fled to India after they failed in an all-out armed revolt that they launched; subsequently it began to publicly advocate "Tibetan independence" and tried to achieve it by force. In the late 1970s, when relations between China and the US improved, the Dalai group, finding that the international situation was unfavorable to it, started to alter its tactics, shifting its attempts from achieving open independence to achieving disguised independence by cloaking them with what is called the "middle way." After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, it again misread the situation and believed that the time was right, it began to demand "complete independence" once again. After 1994, having realized that there was no possibility of achieving this goal, it turned again to the "middle way" and began to lobby for what it now termed "a high degree of autonomy." In recent years, it has intensified its efforts to promote this "middle way" and to disguise it.
The "middle way," also known as the "way of meditation on the mean," is a Buddhist term. It is the Dalai group which has politicized it. Its claims can be summarized into five major points.
First, it denies the fact that Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times; instead it claims that Tibet was "an independent state" which was "occupied by China in 1951," and that "Tibetans have the right to independence from a historic perspective." Second, it seeks to establish a "Greater Tibet" that has never existed at any time in history, claiming that the "Tibet issue" concerns 6 million Tibetans and that Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and other areas that Tibetans and people of other ethnic minorities inhabit in compact communities should be incorporated into a unified administrative region. Third, it demands "a high degree of autonomy" that is not subject to any constraint whatsoever from the central government, denies the leadership of the central government and Tibet's present social and political systems, and proposes to establish an "autonomous government" under which "Tibetans" (in truth the Dalai party) take full charge of all affairs other than diplomacy and national defense. Fourth, it opposes the central government to garrison troops in Tibet and, despite its superficial agreement that the central government holds the authority over national defense, it demands that the central government "withdraws all Chinese troops" to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace." And fifth, in total disregard of the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has been a multi-ethnic region since ancient times, it denies the access of other ethnic groups to "Greater Tibet" and drives them out of regions where they have lived for generations.
Under the "middle way," the Dalai group feigns acceptance of China's sovereignty in Tibet to seize the reins of power and set up a semi-independent political regime under the control of the "Tibetan independence" forces, and ultimately seek full sovereignty and achieve "Tibetan independence" when its governing power is consolidated.
As a political strategy for achieving independence through a series of steps, the "middle way" does not tally with China's history, national reality, state Constitution, laws and basic systems. Neither does it conform to Tibet's history, reality and ethnic relations. Moreover, it runs counter to the fundamental interests of all the people of China, including the Tibetans.
- Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and has never been an independent nation.
Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and, as one of the centuries-old ethnic groups in China, the Tibetans have made important contributions to the formation and evolution of the Chinese nation - a single family sharing a common destiny. Archaeological and historical research shows that since ancient times the Tibetan people have been closely connected with the Han and other ethnic groups in such aspects as consanguinity, language, culture and others, and that there has never been a break in economic, political and cultural exchanges between Tibet and the rest of China. The Tubo regime established in Tibet in the seventh century was a local government of ancient China, which made an important contribution to developing China's southwest frontier.
It was during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) that China's central government formally incorporated Tibet into the central administration. The Yuan government set up the Supreme Control Commission of Buddhism and Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs to directly administer local military, political and religious affairs, conduct censuses in Tibet, set up courier stations, collect taxes, station troops and appoint officials; it also issued and enacted the Yuan criminal law and calendar in Tibet to fully exercise effective administration. The Ming government (1368-1644) implemented a policy of multiple enfeoffment, conferring "prince of Dharma," "national master in Tantrism" and other honorific titles upon religious leaders in various parts of Tibet. Succession to such titles required the approval of the emperor, who would send an envoy to confer the official title on each new prince.
During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the central government granted honorific titles to the leaders of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism - the 5th Dalai Lama and the 5th Panchen Lama - officially establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni and their political and religious status in Tibet. From then on, it became an established convention that the central government conferred the titles of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni.
From 1727, the Qing government started to station grand ministers resident in Tibet to supervise and manage local administration on behalf of the central authorities; in total it appointed more than 100 such grand ministers resident in Tibet. In 1751, the Qing government abolished the system under which the secular princes held power, and formally appointed the 7th Dalai Lama to administer the local government of Tibet, thus establishing theocracy there, and it set up the Kashag (cabinet) composed of four Kalons (ministers) that took orders from the grand ministers resident in Tibet and the Dalai Lama. In 1774, when the British East India Company sent a representative to Tashilhunpo in an attempt to build a direct relationship with Tibet, the 6th Panchen replied that Tibet was part of China's territory and all its affairs were handled in accordance with imperial edicts from the Chinese emperor. In 1793, the Qing government promulgated the Imperially Approved Ordinance for Better Governance of Tibet (29-Article), improving several systems by which the central government administered Tibet. The Ordinance clearly stipulated that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Living Buddhas had to follow the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn," and the selected candidate would be subject to approval by the central authorities of China. Observing the Ordinance, the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas and the 8th, 9th and 11th Panchen Lamas were selected in this way, but 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas and the 10th Panchen Lama did not go through the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn" with approval from the central authorities.
The Republic of China (1912-1949) continued the central government's sovereignty over Tibet and maintained its sovereignty and jurisdiction there. The last Qing emperor Puyi declared in 1912 in the Edict on Qing Emperor's Abdication, "I will return sovereignty to the whole nation and establish it as a constitutional republic," and "Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan ethnic groups will enjoy territorial integrity in this great Republic." The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China in 1912 and the General Outline of the Constitution for the Political Tutelage Period of the Republic of China in 1931 both stipulated that Tibet was a part of the territory of the Republic of China. In 1929, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing established a Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Tibet. In 1940, the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs opened an office in Lhasa as a permanent establishment of the central government in Tibet. The identification and enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama and the 10th Panchen Lama were both done with approval from the government of the Republic of China. In the years of the Republic of China, the central government did its utmost to safeguard the nation's sovereignty over Tibet though hamstrung by constant civil conflicts among warlords and the intrinsic weakness of the nation.
After the People's Republic of China was founded, it became its historic duty to bring an end to national separation and realize national unification under new historical conditions. The peaceful liberation of Tibet and the stationing of the People's Liberation Army in Tibet were two right steps taken by the central government of China in exercising national sovereignty and safeguarding national unification and territorial integrity after a wholesale regime change. The 17-Article Agreement signed in 1951 between the central government and the local government of Tibet was a domestic agreement reached on the basis of respecting and accepting the historical fact that Tibet is part of China. After its peaceful liberation, Tibet had gradually embarked on the socialist path, and the people of Tibet have worked with people of other ethnic groups around the country towards China's progress and development.
History demonstrates clearly that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times, and it has never been an independent nation. In today's world, all countries acknowledge this as a fact; no country has ever acknowledged "Tibetan independence." There is no question about Tibet's political status. After 1959, when he opposed the reform measure abolishing serfdom and defected abroad, the 14th Dalai Lama has no authority whatsoever to represent the people of Tibet, nor has he the right to decide the future and destiny of Tibet. The self-styled "government-in-exile" is an illegitimate political organization engaged in secessionist activities, and no country around the world acknowledges it.
- "Greater Tibet" is sheer fantasy, and does not conform to China's history and national conditions. Talking about the "middle-way" approach by the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers is invariably accompanied by references to "Greater Tibet." In their hypothesis, this "Greater Tibet" extends to southern Xinjiang and the Hexi Corridor in the north, central Gansu and central Sichuan in the east, and to central Yunnan in the south, covering all of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, half of Sichuan Province, half of Gansu Province, a quarter of Yunnan Province, and the southern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In total, this represents an area larger than one quarter of China's total territory.
In China's entire history, there has never been any geographical entity that supports this concept of a "Greater Tibet." The administrative repartition of contemporary China came into being over a long historical course. During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tubo Kingdom was a multi-ethnic regime established by the Tubo people together with other ethnic groups and tribes inhabiting the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and surrounding areas. After the Tubo Kingdom collapsed, the Tubo people shared the plateau together with other ethnic groups without any unified regime. During the Yuan Dynasty, the central government set up the U-Tsang High Pacification Commissioner's Office in Tibet to exercise jurisdiction over Tibet, and Do-kham and Domed High Pacification Commissioner's Offices in other Tibetan-inhabited areas. The three High Pacification Commissioner's Offices were under the Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs (previously the Supreme Control Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs) of the central government. The central government of the Ming Dynasty set up the u-Tsang Military Command and the Ngari Civilian and Military Command in Tibet, which were later upgraded to the u-Tsang Regional Military Commission. It also set up the Do-kham Military Command in the Do-kham area, which was later upgraded to the Do-kham Regional Military Commission. In 1726, in view of the upheaval in Tibet, the Qing imperial government adjusted the administrative divisions of Tibet and neighboring Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai, bringing into being the basic structure of administrative divisions under which the Qing central authorities governed Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. This structure has remained to this day. Never at any point prior to the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951 did the scope of administrative jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet extend beyond the present Tibet Autonomous Region.
"Greater Tibet" was a product of Western colonialist invasions of China and a product of their efforts to split China. The concept is not the brainchild of the Dalai group; it was proposed by British colonialists at the Simla Conference which took place from 1913 to 1914, and it was then written into the illegitimate Simla Accord. The Accord divided Tibetan-inhabited areas in China into "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet"; the former covered the present Tibet Autonomous Region and would have "autonomy," while the latter included Tibetan-inhabited areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, to which the Chinese government could dispatch officials and troops. The proposal was rejected outright by the whole of China, and the delegates of the Chinese government refused to sign and recognize the Simla Accord. As a result the Simla Conference broke down, and the Simla Accord never had any status as a legal document.
However, British colonialists continued to foster and support secessionist forces from the upper levels of Tibetan society, who persisted with their plans to achieve "autonomy" with British support. In his later years the 13th Dalai Lama, who had been exploited by British colonialists, finally woke up to what was happening. In 1930, he told Liu Manqing, a representative of the central government, in Lhasa: "Since it is all Chinese territory, why draw lines between yourselves and ourselves? If we allow ourselves to become ensnared in conflict... it is like brothers fighting each other; it makes no sense."
"Greater Tibet" ignores the history and culture created by all the ethnic groups who have lived together on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. After many years of contact and exchange, some of China's ethnic groups have spread over vast areas, while others live in individual concentrated communities in small areas. In China, it is quite common that people of one single ethnic group live in different administrative regions, while in a single administrative region there can be many different ethnic groups. On the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, particularly in its neighboring regions, there have lived more than a dozen ethnic groups since ancient times. These include Han, Tibetan, Hui, Monba, Lhoba, Qiang, Mongol, Tu, Dongxiang, Bao'an, Yugur, Salar, Lisu, Naxi, Pumi, and Nu, all of whom are masters of this land. The present Tibet and the four provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai are all multi-ethnic regions, which is the result of a long-term history of exchange, communication and blending among various ethnic groups of China. For reasons of geography, history and customs, different Tibetan tribes are under the jurisdiction of the four different provinces, and have lived together with other ethnic groups in these places over a very long time. In the course of this long history, the Tibetan people, spread across different administrative regions, have both maintained some common features and displayed certain differences in language, customs and other aspects. At the same time, they have engaged in frequent political, economic and cultural exchanges with people of other local ethnic groups, and maintained close ties with them, particularly in the economic field, thus sharing the same or similar regional and cultural characteristics with other local peoples.
"Greater Tibet" disrespects China's national conditions. The system of regional ethnic autonomy is one of the basic elements of China's political system. Regional ethnic autonomy means that the minority ethnic groups, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in compact communities and establish their own organs of self-government to exercise their right of autonomy. Ethnic autonomous areas are classified into the three levels of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China. After New China was founded in 1949, in addition to Tibet Autonomous Region, eight Tibetan autonomous prefectures, one Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefecture, one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture and two Tibetan autonomous counties were set up in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, while in some Tibetan autonomous prefectures there are autonomous counties of other ethnic minorities.
Such administrative division takes into account the distribution of different ethnic groups with a view to their future development. It gives expression to the combination of both the ethnical and regional, both political and economic factors that are the outcome of history and contemporary reality, and is conducive to the common prosperity and development of the various ethnic groups in the great family of the Chinese nation. Practice has proven that this system is successful. As the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 14: "Once established, no ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be abolished or merged. Once defined, no boundaries of an ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be altered. Where abolition or merger or alteration is necessary, it will be proposed by the relevant department of the State organ at the next higher level with the organ of self-government of the ethnic autonomous area concerned after full consultation before it is submitted for approval according to legal procedures."
In summary, the concept of "Greater Tibet" the Dalai group seeks to establish runs counter to both history and contemporary reality, and is totally divorced from China's national conditions. "Greater Tibet" disregards the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has long been populated by multiple ethnic groups, warps the true history of multi-ethnic development of the plateau into a false single-ethnic history, creates conflict and artificial differences among various ethnic groups of China, and seeks to establish a purely Tibetan "Greater Tibet" exclusive of all the other ethnic groups. It is thus an archetypal expression of racism and ultra-nationalism.
- "A high degree of autonomy" attempts to set up "a state within a state," which contravenes the Constitution and state systems.
"A high degree of autonomy," also described as "true autonomy" or "genuine autonomy," is another core element of the "middle way" advocated by the Dalai Lama and his followers. It purports to pursue the "power of autonomy" in language, culture, religious affairs, education, environmental protection and some other fields, subject to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. But, the Dalai party's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" also include claims that undermine national unity, sovereignty and the state systems of China; the essence of "a high degree of autonomy" is to set up "a state within state" free of any control from the central government. The first issue is the relationship between the "autonomous government" and the central government of China. Through "a high degree of autonomy," the Dalai group proposes to establish an "autonomous government" through "democratic elections." "All affairs except diplomacy and national defense should be under the full responsibility of the Tibetan people"; and "Tibetan people should have the power to set up a local government, governmental organizations and institutions that meet their demands and are in line with their characteristics. The people's congresses in autonomous areas have the authority to make laws and regulations for all issues, and the enforcement power and discretionary power in all departments of the autonomous government..."
This actually places the "autonomous government" in a position of independence and removes it from any level of authority exercised by the central government; it establishes an alternative set of political systems by overturning the ones currently effective in Tibet Autonomous Region.
The second issue concerns military affairs in Tibet. The Dalai party takes the position that "Only when troops of the Communist Party of China withdraw completely from the region, can we start real reconciliation." It also demands that "regional peace conferences shall be held to ensure Tibet remains a demilitarized zone," proposing to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace" and a "buffer between China and India," attempting to move China's internal affairs into the international arena.
Tibet is a component of the People's Republic of China, and the central government stationing troops in Tibet serves as a symbol of state sovereignty and is out of the needs of national security. The Dalai group's opposition to the central government stationing troops in Tibet is clear evidence of its intention to seek complete independence.
The third issue concerns the rights of other ethnic groups. The Dalai group demands that the central government must "prevent further migration into Tibet and return the Han people who have migrated into Tibet back to China." Samdhong Rinpoche, an influential figure in the Dalai group, declared in a speech in 2005, "The whole area inhabited by Tibetan people should be under the regional ethnic autonomous control of Tibetans themselves; Han and other groups are like guests and should not restrict our rights in any form."
As has already been demonstrated, the so-called "Greater Tibet" region, and particularly the neighboring areas of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, has for centuries been a corridor of frequent migration of China's different ethnic groups, who have lived together and depended on each other in this region. The Dalai group's logic is absurd and chilling, proposing to force tens of millions of people of other ethnic groups out of this region where they have lived for generations. The net result of "a high degree of autonomy" would be tantamount to an ethnic cleansing of the plateau.
The fourth issue concerns the "one country, two systems" policy. The Dalai group bases its demand for "a high degree of autonomy" on the "one country, two systems" policy; it believes that Tibet is "special" and should have even greater rights of autonomy than Hong Kong and Macau.
"One country, two systems" is a basic state policy adopted by the central government of China to resolve the issues of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, and to realize the peaceful reunification of our country. But the Tibet issue has nothing in common with the situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. The Taiwan issue was a carry-over from the KMT-CPC civil war. The issues of Hong Kong and Macau were the direct result of imperialist aggression against China, and they concerned the resumption of sovereignty. Tibet has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times, over which the central government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction. So the issue of resuming exercise of sovereignty does not arise.
This demonstrates that "a high degree of autonomy" is a mask that conceals the true aim of realizing complete independence; and its purpose is to deny China's sovereignty over Tibet and establish a "Greater Tibet" beyond the jurisdiction of the central government. There is no prospect of it ever coming to pass, for the following reasons:
First, it violates the principles of the Constitution of China concerning ethnic relationships. The Constitution states clearly in the Preamble: "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-ethnic state built up jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among them and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the ethnic groups, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also necessary to combat local-national chauvinism." Article 4 says: "All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal... Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the ethnic groups or instigate their secession are prohibited." The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 48: "The organ of self-government of an ethnic autonomous area shall guarantee equal rights for the various ethnic groups in the area." The Dalai group's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" are an expression of ultra-nationalism that negates the equal rights of ethnic groups in Tibet.
Second, "a high degree of autonomy" runs counter to the present state structure of China. When founded, the People's Republic of China inherited a unitary state structure, with a unitary Constitution and legal system. In China, the state is constituted by local administrative regions rather than local governments. As the Constitution stipulates in Article 57: "The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power." It also stipulates in Article 58: "The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the state."
Local governments at various levels are all subordinate to the central government and thus shall be subject to its administration - de jure, there is no power subject equal in status to the central government. "A high degree of autonomy" denies the supreme power of the NPC and defies the authority of the central government. Instead, it demands the legislative power of the state, and interprets the administrative relationship between local government and the central government as a "cooperative" or peer-to-peer relationship between political entities. In China, there is no such a thing as the central government and a local government "negotiate" on an equal footing, seek "consent" from each other, and then find a "solution through cooperation."
Third, "a high degree of autonomy" runs counter to China's fundamental political system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. As aforementioned, the system of regional ethnic autonomy is a basic political system of China. In an autonomous area, people of various ethnic groups enjoy equal rights, and such rights are protected by the Constitution and other laws. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China. The people's governments of ethnic autonomous areas are local organs of the state power at the relevant levels, as well as organs of self-government in these areas. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 15: "The people's governments of all ethnic autonomous areas will be administrative organs of the State under the unified leadership of the State Council and will be subordinate to it." Tibet, as an autonomous region of China, is naturally under the leadership of the central government. The Dalai group's claims for "a high degree of autonomy" represent an out-and-out denial of China's system of regional ethnic autonomy.
In Buddhism, the "meditation on the mean" advocates rejection of two biases - "real existence" and "having evil views of the doctrine of voidness" (dur-grhita suyata), and advocates the avoidance of extremes. But the actual political claims of the members of the Dalai group are all about independence. Ringleaders of the group, including the 14th Dalai Lama's two brothers - Gyalo Thondup and Tenzin Chogyal, and Samdhong Rinpoche, an influential member of the leading group, once stated that they first seek autonomy, and then drive out the Chinese! Autonomy will be the start...; the first step is to realize the semi-independence of Tibet in the name of autonomy, and the
is to transit to its independence. The new head of the Tibetan "government-in-exile" once told Dialogue India, "Tibetan independence does not conflict with Tibetan autonomy. Dialectically, the former is the principle goal while the latter is a realistic target." To pursue the "middle way" and realize independence by stages, the Dalai party try their best to appeal to contemporary international trends, presenting their claims for independence as a call to fairness, justice, democracy and freedom under the banner of such expressions as "the third way," "national self-determination," "ethnic autonomy," "non-violence" and "win-win." However, they have no prospect of success as their goals are completely divorced from China's national conditions and Tibet's reality, and violate China's Constitution, its laws, and its basic systems.
IV. A Veneer of Peace and Non-violence
Over the years, the Dalai group has propagated its "middle way" with the use of such terms "peace" and "non-violence" to hide its true nature, feigning beneficence to gain international sympathy and support. Looking beyond the warm words, however, it is not difficult to find evidence that they have been willing to resort to both violence and non-violence, and to carry out violence under the guise of non-violence. For the Dalai party, "peace" and "non-violence" are no more than fig leaves, and in truth they have never abandoned the use of violence to promote their ultimate goal of "Tibetan independence."
- The Dalai party has never abandoned the use of violence to achieve their ultimate goal of full independence.
In 1959, the Dalai party launched a large-scale armed revolt against officials the central government stationed in Tibet, and massacred local Tibetans who supported democratic reform. The 14th Dalai Lama was not only well-informed of the action but gave it his active support. He wrote in his book My Spiritual Autobiography: "Every one of them is armed to teeth, and even my personal cook is carrying a bazooka, with his waist belt full of ammunition. He has been well trained by the CIA..."
After the 14th Dalai Lama fled to India, he reorganized an army and waited to "fight his way back to Tibet." In 1960 in Mustang, a county in north Nepal, he rebuilt the "Chushi Gangdruk," an anti-Chinese guerilla force. In 1962, with support from external powers, he built a Special Frontier Force composed of mainly Tibetan exiles. From 1961 to 1965, these forces sneaked across the border 204 times to harass Chinese border troops and civilians.
The Dalai group has got armed support from the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to the US archives disclosed, the Dalai Lama first established contacts with the US government in 1951 after the peaceful liberation of Tibet. During the armed rebellion in Tibet, the CIA not only sent agents to help the 14th Dalai to flee, but also purposefully trained militants to support his forces and airdropped a large quantity of weaponry. An article titled "Heiliger Schein" published on June 8, 2012 in the Suddeutsche Zeitung commented that, as the leading exponent of pure pacifism, Dalai's knowledge of the CIA's infiltration in Tibet was probably much more than he had admitted so far; and this tainted the spiritual leader. The article also pointed out that the 14th Dalai Lama's relationship with CIA was "incompatible with his status as the supreme moral authority."
With the evolving international situation since the late 1970s, the Dalai group's use of violence was steadily losing public support. It turned to a new dual strategy: constantly provoking incidents of violence to keep up the pressure on the central government, while publicly proclaiming non-violence to deceive his international audience. In the 1980s, a succession of violent incidents took place, planned or instigated by the Dalai party. On September 21, 1987, the 14th Dalai Lama made a speech to the US congress, calling for independence. On September 27, in the square of Jokhang Temple, a group of lamas shouted separatist slogans, attacked police, and injured many civilians. On October 1, a small gang of rioters raided the police station on Barkhor Street in Lhasa and burned seven cars, leaving dozens of policemen injured. The rioters proclaimed that the Dalai Lama was fighting for Tibetan independence. They demanded the support of bystanders and the general public, and threatened personal retaliation on those who failed to join them. On March 5, 1988, during the Monlam Prayer Festival, a gang of rioters stormed into local Party and government offices and police stations around the Jokhang Temple and Barkhor Street, smashing and burning cars and shops, leading to 299 police and civilian casualties. From March 5 to 7 of 1989, Lhasa witnessed another riot in which one policeman was shot dead and 40 others were injured, and 107 shops and 24 government offices, primary schools and neighborhood committees destroyed. On March 11, 1992, nine Tibetan separatists attacked the Chinese embassy in India with fire bombs.
A much more serious riot took place on March 14, 2008. That day, a mob congregated in the downtown area of Lhasa, assaulting innocent passers-by with weapons including rocks, daggers and clubs, smashing and looting vehicles, shops, banks, the Telecom business offices, and government properties, severely disrupting social order, and causing heavy losses of life and property. During the incident, there were over 300 cases of arson, while 908 shops, seven schools, 120 houses, and five hospitals were damaged. Ten bank branches were looted, at least 20 buildings were burnt to the ground, and 84 vehicles were torched. Most seriously, a total of 18 people were burnt or hacked to death, and 382 people were injured - 58 of them seriously. There is ample evidence that the March 14 riot was organized, masterminded and instigated by the Dalai group. After the incident, the 14th Dalai Lama himself released a statement through his personal secretariat, describing the riots as "peaceful protests." On March 16, he said in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that he would not ask the rioters to stop because their demands came from the Tibetan people, and he had to respect their will. In the meantime, the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), very much under the influence of the Dalai, passed a resolution to "immediately organize guerrillas to infiltrate China for armed struggle." The head of the TYC claimed that they were ready to sacrifice another 100 Tibetans to win complete victory. ( - The separatists' attempts to disrupt the Olympic Games expose their hypocrisy.
The Olympic Games are a symbol of peace, friendship and progress, which is welcomed and cherished by all peoples. The Tibetan separatists' disruption of the Beijing Olympic Games exposed their hollow image of "non-violence."
In May 2007, the Tibetan independence forces and the international anti-China forces held the Fifth International Campaign for Tibet in Brussels. It was attended by Samten, leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile. At this meeting, a strategic plan was agreed to launch a campaign to boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Later, the Tibet independence organizations in the US put forward proposals for a "Tibetan people's uprising." Believing the 2008 Olympic Games represented the last opportunity to achieve the Tibetan independence, they decided to take advantage of this "opportunity" while China was the focus of international attention before the Olympic Games. Their goal was to "instigate and coordinate activities within Tibet to create crisis for China."
Towards the end of 2007, radical groups, such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA), held meetings in India, announcing plans to launch a People's Uprising in Tibet. On January 4 and January 25, 2008, seven Tibetan independence organizations held a press conference in New Delhi, India, releasing proposals for this uprising, spreading the news on more than 100 websites, and threatening to instigate constant large-scale uprisings from March 10, 2008. On March 10, the 14th Dalai made a speech, urging his followers within Chinese territory to engage in violence. On the same day, the TYC made a statement, claiming that it would "now seize a most important opportunity never before seen in our struggle for independence - the upcoming Olympic Games," and that it would "spare neither blood nor life for Tibetan independence."
Masterminded and instigated by the Dalai group, the Tibetan independence forces engaged in a series of sabotage activities against the Beijing Olympic Games. They interfered with important ceremonies, including disrupting the torch-lighting ceremony in Greece and attempting to grab the Olympic torch during the torch relay in various countries, provoking a strong reaction from the international community.
- The 14th Dalai Lama encourages deluded lamas and lay followers to engage in self-immolation.
In August 2011, the new leader of the so-called Tibetan government-in-exile announced a new commitment to non-violence. Subsequently, the Dalai group leadership began to incite Tibetan lamas and lay followers inside China to engage in acts of self-immolation, leading to a series of such incidents in a number of regions. On May 29, 2012, at a TYC candlelight rally to commemorate Tibetans who had conducted self-immolation, its head claimed, "Tibetan independence will neither fall from the sky nor grow from the earth; rather it relies on our efforts and action and needs sacrifice." From September 25 to 28, 2012, the Dalai group convened the Second Special Meeting of Tibetans in Exile, describing self-immolation as the highest form of non-violence, hailing its unfortunate victims as "national heroes," building memorials and raising special funds for them. For a period that ensued, the Dalai group vigorously preached that "self-immolation does not go against Buddhist doctrine" and that "self-immolation is martyrdom and Bodhisattva deeds," duping Buddhist believers in Tibet - and particularly innocent young people - and setting them on a path of ruin. The inevitable result was a sudden increase in self-immolations.
Investigations by China's public security organs into incidents of self-immolation revealed clearly that they are being manipulated and instigated at the highest level by the Dalai group. Kirti Gompa in the Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture is where the greatest number of self-immolation incidents have taken place; it has been proved that these incidents have close links with the Dalai group.
The Dalai group has four ways to instigate self-immolation: first, planning incidents from abroad through a so-called "press liaison group" based in Kirti Gompa in Sichuan and the Kirti Monastery in India; second, sending TYC members into Tibet to incite self-immolation; third, mobilizing people returning from overseas to abet self-immolation; and fourth, using the Internet and "Tibetan independence" media to hype up self-immolation.
The Dalai group has also released a Self-immolation Guide on the Internet - an instruction manual to incite Tibetans residing within China to burn themselves. The author of this Guide is Lhamo Je, who served for two terms as a "member" of the "parliament in exile." The Self-immolation Guide consists of four parts: the first part advocates the idea that self-immolators are "great, honorable and intrepid heroes" and that "both these male and female heroes" should always be prepared to sacrifice themselves for the "just cause." The second part gives detailed instructions on "preparations for self-immolation," including "picking important days and places," "leaving written or recorded last words," and "asking trustworthy friends to help record videos or take photos." The third part introduces the "self-immolation slogans," instructing victims to always shout the same slogans. And the fourth part illustrates other activities in company with self-immolation. The Self-immolation Guide is a death guide filled with a sense of terror. In Tibetan Buddhism, writing and spreading such instructions is contrary to Buddhist teachings and supposed to be a sin.
Inflicting self-immolation in public is itself an act of violence, intended to create an atmosphere of terror and horror. On this issue of principle, the 14th Dalai Lama played an infamous role. On November 8, 2011, when the incidents of self-immolation had just begun, he said in an interview that the point was the self-immolation demanded courage, and a great deal of courage indeed. He thereby both showed his appreciation for and approval of self-immolators. On January 3, 2012, he defended self-immolation on the basis that it was superficially an act of violence, but what differentiated violence and non-violence was the motives and aims behind each act, and only an act driven by hatred and anger was violence. It was clear that he regarded self-immolation an action of non-violence. On October 8, 2012, he said in an interview that he was sure that self-immolators were sacrificing themselves with a sincere motivation and for the benefit of Buddhism and well-being of Tibetans, and that, from the Buddhist point of view, it was a positive act. Through these words, he has repeatedly and explicitly offered his approval of and compliments for self-immolation. He has also hosted dharma assembly acting in his capacity as a religious leader to expiate the sins of the dead, chant scriptures and pray for them, an action which turns out to be very incendiary to innocent believers in Buddhism.
Respecting life and opposing violence are basic tenets of Buddhism. Buddhism opposes killing and suicide, and advocates leniency, and valuing, loving and saving all beings. Suicide is a taboo set by Buddha. In Buddhist classics, suicide and instigate others to take their own lives are both major evils. The Buddhist precepts such as Dharmagupta-vinaya, Mahishasaka Vinaya, and Shikchapada Vinaya all stipulate that, if bhiksu kills, asks others to kill himself, or teaches others to kill themselves, he thus breaches the precepts, disqualifies himself as a bhiksu, and should be expelled from Sangha. In Buddhism, it is believed that inducing, inciting, or praising suicide, and assisting with or facilitating suicide are a great asukla-karman (sin). The Dalai group's attitude and response to Tibetans' self-immolations are encouraging them to commit suicide, a criminal act. It not only runs counter to basic human conscience and morality, but also tramples on Buddhist doctrine and contravenes the Buddhist outlook on life.
In order to safeguard people's rights and defend the dignity of the law, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures to stop self-immolation, save innocent lives, and bring the criminals involved in these incidents to justice in accordance with the law.
- The Dalai group incites inter-ethnic animosity and trains its supporters to promote independence through violence.
Over the years, the Dalai party has, to realize "Tibetan independence," constantly stoked the flames of division between Tibetan and other ethnic groups, sowing discord and inciting inter-ethnic animosity. Since the failure of his attempted rebellion in 1959, the 14th Dalai has made frequent statements in his speeches such as:
"the Red Han people were snakes in your chest and abominable..."
"the Han people are like psychopaths..."
"they tortured us Tibetans ruthlessly and treat us like beasts..."
"after their arrival, Tibetans had more pain to suffer, so the cause of our pain is them..."
"the Han people are cruel and malicious, aiming to wipe Tibetans out..."
"the CPC has slaughtered over one million Tibetans..."
In recent years, the Dalai group has intensified sentiments of hatred among the young by exploiting self-immolation, exhibiting grotesque photos in schools, forcing students to pay tribute to self-immolators, attacking the central government's policies in Tibet, and building up inter-ethnic animosity and division.
The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), founded in 1970, is a radical organization for "Tibetan independence" giving its allegiance to the 14th Dalai; it is to train successors to the "cause of Tibetan independence." Its charter stipulates that it will "follow the correct leadership and guidance of Dalai Lama," "devote to Tibet's just cause for freedom and independence," "even at the cost of life." Ever since the time it was founded, the TYC has constantly promoted violence and acts of terrorism. TYC leaders have made the various following claims:
"Armed struggle and the use of violence are the only road to the complete independence of Tibet..."
"Acts of terror can maximize the effect at minimal cost..."
"Acts of terror can exert wide influence and attract the attention of the international community to the Tibet issue..."
On July 3, 2003, the then TYC leader Kelzang Phuntsok said in an interview, "We will try all means, violent or non-violent, to achieve our goal." For years, the TYC not only schemed and incited ill-informed people to engage in violence, but also actively trained armed and reserve forces. They set up military training bases in Dharamsala, India, and established the "Tibetan Freedom Fighters Association" to carry out armed sabotage and sent people to contact international terrorist organizations to seek mutual support. TYC has had a hand in many incidents of violence and terror in Tibet and other places in China.
For the political purpose of training successors for the cause of "Tibetan independence," the Dalai group masterminded the "Tibetan infants" incidents, a real human tragedy by taking infants away from their parents. According to the report of Swiss newspaper Neue Zuercher Zeitung, in 1960s, about 200 Tibetan infants were taken from their parents and sent to Switzerland for adoption through a Swiss businessman in collusion with the 14th Dalai Lama, claiming these children were orphans. His doing violated common ethics and morality, trampled on children's rights, and is despised by every person with a sense of justice.
The Dalai group has also employed political and religious persecution against dissidents to maintain its authority. Rivals have been eliminated by assassination and poisoning. In the late 1990s, Kundeling, the living Buddha, was stabbed and severely wounded at his home, while Trisong and Sumpa, two young living Buddhas, faced death threats. It has been confirmed that the Dalai group had a hand in these events.